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This article builds on Yohe's seminal piece on mitigative capacity which elaborates 
'determinants' of mitigative capacity, also reflected in the IPCC's third assessment 
report. We propose a revised definition, where mitigative capacity is a country's ability 
to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions or enhance natural sinks. By 
"ability" we mean skills, competencies, fitness, and proficiencies that a country has 
attained which can contribute to GHG emissions mitigation. A conceptual framework is 
proposed, linking mitigative capacity to a country's sustainable development path, and 
grouping the factors influencing mitigative capacity into three main sets: economic 
factors, institutional ones, and technology. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
factors is presented, showing how these factors vary across countries. We suggest that it 
is the interplay between the three economic factors - income, abatement cost and 
opportunity cost - that shape mitigative capacity. We find that income is an important 
economic factor influencing mitigative capacity, while abatement cost is important in 
turning mitigative capacity into actual mitigation. Technology is a critical mitigative 
capacity, including the ability to absorb existing climate friendly technologies or to 
develop innovative ones. Institutional factors that promote mitigative capacity include 
the effectiveness of government regulation, clear market rules, a skilled work force and 
public awareness. We briefly investigate such as high abatement cost or lack of political 
willingness, that prevent mitigative capacity from being translated into mitigation. 
 
Résumé 
Cet article s’intéresse aux déterminants de la capacité à atténuer le changement climatique. 
Ceux-ci ont été élaborés initialement dans un papier de Yohe puis dans le troisième rapport 
d’évaluation du GIEC. Après avoir revisité la définition de la capacité à atténuer le changement 
climatique, nous identifions trois groupes de facteurs influençant de façon croisée cette 
capacité : des facteurs économiques, technologiques et institutionnels. Au niveau économique, 
ce sont à la fois le revenu, le coût de réduction des émissions et le coût d’opportunité lié aux 
réductions qui forgent la capacité d’atténuation. Du côté technologique, c’est la capacité à 
absorber  ou à développer des technologies peu émettrices de gaz à effet de serre qui est 
déterminante. Enfin, au niveau institutionnel, l’efficacité de la régulation gouvernementale, la 
transparence des règles de marché, une main d’œuvre qualifiée et une sensibilisation de la 
population sont des éléments clés. Notre analyse est menée à la fois qualitativement et 
quantitativement. Elle permet de montrer comment les facteurs influençant la capacité 
d’atténuation varient d’un pays à l’autre. 




Climate change is one of the foremost challenges facing the global community. Since the 
beginning of the industrial revolution, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2), the 
chief heat-trapping greenhouse gas (GHG), have risen 35 percent.  This increase is primarily 
due to the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.  If current emissions trends are not altered, 
global temperatures are expected to rise 1.4 to 5.8º C (2.5 to 10.4º F) by 2100, according to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001a).  The effects of such temperature 
changes on agricultural production, water supply, forests, and overall human development are 
not fully known, but are likely to be detrimental to a large portion of the world’s population, 
particularly in developing countries.   
The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change establishes the ultimate objective of 
stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at a level that avoids dangerous human 
interference with the climate system.  The Convention also establishes guidance regarding the 
relative degree of effort expected by Parties.  Namely, while all Parties should take GHG 
mitigation actions, they should do so on the basis of equity and their “common but 
differentiated responsibilities  and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC 1992).  Further, Parties 
have a “right” to sustainable development, and the “[p]olicies and measures to protect the 
climate system … should be … integrated with national development programmes” (Article 
3.4). Thus, the basic framework agreed to by all Parties is that countries should undertake GHG 
mitigation on the basis of their relative responsibility for the problem and capability to take 
actions, within the broader context of promoting sustainable development. 
The concept of “responsibility” is well known and has been examined widely. The 
industrialized countries, home to about 20% of the world’s population, have contributed 
approximately 75% of the total of CO2 emissions from energy sources since 1850. Since 1950, 
if CO2 from deforestation is also included in the calculation, this figure shifts to just over 50% 
(WRI 2003). At the same time, it is clear that annual emissions of developing countries are 
growing rapidly, and will need to be slowed in order to  promote sustainable development.  
On the other hand, the concept of “capability” to mitigate climate change is not well understood 
in the climate policy community, and has been less frequently examined in the literature.  This 
paper explores the concept of mitigative capacity, and seeks to advance the existing literature on 
this topic in several ways.   
The concept of mitigative capacity needs to be understood within the broader context of 
promoting sustainable development, a consideration that will remain essential for both the 
developed and developing world (Winkler et al. 2002; Munasinghe & Swart 2005; Shukla et al. 
2002; Davidson 2002; Gupta & Bhandari 1999; Pan 2002; Heller & Shukla 2003).  The IPCC’s 
work on emission scenarios shows that different future development pathways will have a very 
large influence on eventual emission levels.  Accordingly, in achieving the Convention 
objective, development paths are at least as important as climate policy—a factor that should 
not be overlooked in the efforts to broaden the participation in emission-reduction efforts in the 
international climate regime (see overviews in Baumert et al. 2002; Bodansky et al. 2004; 
Höhne et al. 2004; Swart et al. 2003). 
Mitigative capacity may provide an important link between development pathways and 
mitigation.  While alternative development pathways lead to different levels of emissions, it is 
the capacity to change from one pathway to another—either through mitigation policy, but also 
through non-climate policy—that is important (Robinson et al. forthcoming). Understanding the 
factors that influence mitigative capacity may help illuminate how the shift of development 
paths might occur. A closer examination of the factors should make clear where capacities are 
applied to climate change specifically, and where broader development policies are more 
influential. 
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First, we offer a simplified definition of mitigative capacity.  Second, we offer a conceptual 
framework, with which the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (TAR) set of mitigative capacity 
determinants can readily align.  This article also elaborates some of these determinants further.  
Third, in subsequent sections, we seek to provide quantitative analysis of some of the factors 
that shape mitigative capacity, suggesting that analysis of the data used in mitigation analysis 
will shed further light on mitigative capacity, including which countries have more of it, or less.  
Not all the factors that influence mitigative capacity are quantifiable, which poses inherent 
limits to this analysis.  Nevertheless, our view is that a quantitative analysis could deepen 
understanding of mitigative capacity.  Indeed, the TAR noted that “[d]eveloping indicators of 
mitigative capacity could help determine who should be expected to do what in terms of 
mitigation”.(IPCC 2001b: 107) Finally, we discuss how mitigative capacity may be turned into 
actual mitigation, emphasising the importance of distinguishing clearly between the two.    
 
2.  Definitions and conceptual frameworks 
The IPCC Third Assessment Report defines a nation’s mitigative capacity as reflecting “its 
ability to diminish the intensity of the natural (and other) stresses to which it might be 
exposed”.(Banuri & Weyant 2001: 103)  Following on a seminal piece by Yohe (2001), the 
IPCC offers a listing of “determinants” of mitigative capacity:  
1.  range of viable technological options for reducing emissions;  
2.  range of viable policy instruments with which the country might effect the adoption of 
these options;  
3.  structure of critical institutions and the derivative allocation of decision-making 
authority;  
4.  availability and distribution of resources required to underwrite their adoption and the 
associated, broadly defined opportunity cost of devoting those resources to mitigation;  
5.  stock of human capital, including education and personal security;  
6.  stock of social capital, including the definition of property rights;  
7.  country’s access to risk-spreading processes (e.g., insurance, options and futures 
markets, etc.); and  
8.  ability of decision makers to manage information, the processes by which these decision 
makers determine which information is credible, and the credibility of the decision 
makers themselves.  
The IPCC, citing Yohe (2001), framed mitigative capacity as related to technology, policy 
options and resources, but also “upon nation-specific characteristics that facilitate the pursuit of 
sustainable development – e.g., the distribution of resources, the relative empowerment of 
various segments of the population, the credibility of empowered decision makers, the degree to 
which climate objectives complement other objectives, access to credible information and 
analyses, the will to act on that information, the ability to spread risk intra- and inter-
generationally, and so on”  (IPCC 2001b: 21).
1 This view of mitigative capacity is explicitly 
presented as the “mirror image” of adaptive capacity, which is considerably developed in the 
IPCC TAR on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation.(IPCC 2001c).  
We define mitigative capacity simply as a country’s ability to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions or enhance natural sinks. By "ability" we mean skills, competencies, fitness, and 
proficiencies that a country has attained which can contribute to GHG emissions mitigation.  
 
                                                      
1 Section 1.3 of the Technical Summary of WGIII contribution to the Third Assessment Report, p. 21  
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This definition differs somewhat from the TAR definition which, as noted, conceptually 
“mirrors” the definition of adaptive capacity.  Under the TAR formulation, adaptive capacity 
deals with reducing exposure or sensitivity to stresses (e.g., climatic events), whereas mitigative 
capacity speaks to reducing the intensity of the stress itself.  Yet, as a practical matter, under this 
formulation, only large (i.e. high emissions) countries could have mitigative capacity.  Small 
countries have no ability to reduce the stress of climate change on them; that is, no amount of 
capacity that they have, from a climate change mitigation point of view (unlike an adaptation 
point of view), will reduce the stress of climate change. Rather, it will be the mitigation 
activities (or lack thereof) undertaken by the rest of the world that will determine the level of 
climatic change.  By emphasizing stresses, the TAR definition of mitigative capacity lessens the 
focus on GHG emissions, the build-up of which is the direct cause of anthropogenic climate 
change. Furthermore, the emphasis on natural stresses (with ‘other’ in brackets) seems 
inappropriate for mitigation, which focuses on reducing anthropogenic emissions. Accordingly, 
the simple definition we adopt focuses directly on GHG emissions.   
 
We acknowledge that in important ways the factors influencing adaptive and mitigative capacity 
are overlapping and mutually supportive. Certainly adaptive and mitigative capacities are rooted 
in the same substrate – the development path of a country – but they differ in application. The 
same capacity may be applied either to respond to the impacts of climate change, or to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As mitigative capacity is translated into actual mitigation (see 
section 6), the capacity becomes more concrete and specific. The definition adopted here 
recognizes some inherent differences between the application of adaptive and mitigative 
capacity.  For example, applying an increased adaptive capacity reduces the vulnerability at a 
community or local level within a country. The use of mitigative capacity (i.e. actual 
mitigation), by contrast, reduces the intensity of climate change at a global scale by slowing the 
atmospheric build-up of greenhouse gases.  The benefits (or even costs) that this reaps for a 
particular community or country are relatively indirect, a key fact which makes climate change 
mitigation so immensely challenging. Because mitigative capacity is a complex issue, and our 
definition is simple, some initial elaboration is required.   
First, we need to clarify that mitigative capacity is the ability to reduce GHG emissions in either 
absolute or relative terms.  Absolute reductions would be analogous to most targets under the 
Kyoto Protocol, where most Annex I Parties are required to reduce their emissions below 1990 
levels.(UNFCCC 1997)  Relative emission reductions, in contrast, would reduce GHG 
emissions against a rising business-as-usual projection, but absolute emissions (t CO2 / year) 
may still rise. For developing countries that have never reached high levels of emissions, 
relative reductions can also be called ‘avoided emissions’.  In other words, absolute emissions 
could continue to rise, but at a slower pace (unless the intensity improvement was very 
stringent).  
Second, mitigative capacity is not intended to simply explain the degree to which countries do 
in fact mitigate GHGs. It is about how much countries could mitigate - the ability to reduce 
emissions. If we compare mitigation to climbing a wall, then our ability to do so would depend 
on how strong, healthy and well-equipped we are, but also on characteristics of the wall itself 
(e.g. height, material it is made of, etc.). Does mitigative capacity refer only to our capabilities 
for climbing or to the combination of those capabilities and the characteristics of the wall? The 
focus of this paper is on capacity and the factors influencing it, in other words capability. 
However, capacity remains an abstraction without considering how it is translated into practical 
action. The translation of capacity into actual mitigation matters - the combination of climbing 
capabilities and wall in our analogy. What is less clear is whether it determines the capacity in 
turn. We briefly open this discussion in section 6, which is particularly relevant to 
understanding why countries fail to exercise their mitigative capacity. More work is needed on 
the translation of mitigative capacity into actual mitigation and the barriers to mitigation.   
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Third, the basis of mitigative capacity in alternative development paths establishes a conceptual 
link between climate and sustainable development (non-climate) policies. Reducing emissions – 
where they are already high – requires capacity. Mitigation should be carried out in a way that 
allows economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner, i.e. mitigation should not 
threaten a country’s sustainable development (UNFCCC 1992: Article 2).  Equally, however, 
following a more sustainable development path would avoid emissions, a fact of particular 
relevance for countries starting from relatively low emissions levels.  Such countries would not 
need to get dirty first, to clean up later, thereby clearly contributing to the global mitigation 
effort. The capacity to choose an alternative development path is also mitigative capacity, in so 
far as that path has relatively lower emissions, and it is clearly related to sustainable 
development (Swart et al. 2003).  
Fourth, we consider the extent to which mitigative and adaptive capacity are distinct, and the 
level at which they could be considered as part of a broader response capacity (Burch & 
Robinson 2005). Response capacity is a very generalised form of ability to do something, not 
limited to any specific use. A well-educated work-force, for example, is capable in several 
different ways. At that general level, capacuities are linked – they are all rooted in the same 
development path. Once that generalized capacity is made concrete in terms of policies or 
institutional mandates for either mitigation or adaptation, it becomes more specific. Agencies or 
policies created to implement or support low-carbon energy systems (a form of mitigative 
capacity), for example, are different from those needed for development of resilient water 
systems (adaptive capacity).     
Finally, as the IPCC has illustrated through its eight “determinants”, mitigative capacity has 
multiple dimensions that are overlapping and interrelated.  In attempts to clarify these 
dimensions, we offer a conceptual framework for mitigative capacity consisting of three main 
factors:  economic factors, institutional ones, and technology.  These three sets of factors are 
types of ‘ability’ in our definition of mitigative capacity. The factors are elaborated in the 
subsequent three sections and include multiple sub-factors and dimensions, some of which are 
not yet fully explored here. The sets of factors cannot be entirely separated, but indeed there are 
important interactions between them.  The IPCC determinants of mitigative capacity can be 
mapped to these three broad factors (and sub-factors).  However, we adopt the term “factor” in 
lieu of “determinant” because the latter suggests that each single item is decisive—if it is not 
present, there is no mitigative capacity.  We prefer to call them factors, which in different 
combinations and weights collectively determine mitigative capacity.  As the IPCC noted, there 
may be cases where a single factor has such great weight for a particular country that it is indeed 
decisive, but in other cases deficiencies in one factor may be compensated by other factors.  
This applies to economic factors as much as any other set.  
 
3. Economic  factors 
The fourth ‘determinant’ of mitigative capacity in the TAR is the “availability and distribution 
of resources required to underwrite their adoption and the associated, broadly defined 
opportunity cost of devoting those resources to mitigation” (IPCC 2001b; Yohe 2001).     
Economic capacity is more central to the ability to reduce GHG emissions than the cryptic 
reference to availability of resources may suggest. The factors considered in this section are the 
ability to pay (related to income), abatement cost (the cost to mitigate) and opportunity cost (the 
foregone alternative use of money that would have been spent on mitigation).  
3.1  Ability to pay  
A country’s income, measured by GDP per capita, is a first rough approximation of the 
availability of financial resources – although the complex issues of distribution and opportunity 
cost deserve further attention. Ability to pay, measured by GDP per capita, is an important 
factor in mitigative capacity - more wealth gives countries greater capacity to reduce emissions.  
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Figure 1: Total and per capita income for selected countries and regions, 2000 
Data source: CAIT (WRI 2003) 
 
Figure 1 shows selected regions grouped by per capita income on the y-axis, with the size of the 
dot showing total size of the economy as measured by GDP. Mitigative capacity may depend on 
per capita income in the first instance, but the absolute size of the economy also influences the 
extent to which a country can reduce emissions. In general, the higher GDP per capita and 
absolute size of the economy, the higher the ability to turn mitigative capacity into high levels 
of actual mitigation. 
Analysis of ability to pay in isolation is limited. Income needs to be related to the expenditure 
required.  
3.2  Abatement cost  
How might abatement cost relate to ability to pay, and the two factors together shape mitigative 
capacity? One would probably think of income as the capacity per se, but how effectively this 
capacity can be applied depends on costs.  Abatement cost is an important factor that can act as 
a barrier in turning mitigative capacity into actual mitigation.  
We examine some data on average abatement costs and ability to pay to investigate this 
question.  We relate ability to pay (using GDPppp per capita as a proxy ) to expenditure on 
mitigation.   
Economic analysis of mitigation cost often focuses on marginal costs (Halsnaes et al. 1998; 
Hourcade & Robinson 1996) or total costs as a share of GDP (Azar & Schneider 2002; 
Nordhaus 1993). As the marginal cost reflects the cost of the last GHG ton abated, it does not 
provide information on the overall burden that a certain volume of emissions reductions may 
represent for the economy. Total cost as a share of GDP may show the effort rate imposed by 
mitigation on the economy. Average costs of achieving a certain level of mitigation allow for 
comparison of the cost per ton abated across countries. We have chosen to focus on the latter for 
our present purpose. 
  Page 6 of 18 What Factors Influence Mitigative Capacity?    Draft accepted for publication in Energy Policy     
The data below stems from the POLES model
2 under the assumption that all countries reduce 
their CO2 emissions by 20 % relative to their reference emissions in 2030. Under this 
assumption, 2030 world emissions are 71 % higher than in 1990. All developing countries show 
emission levels greater than in 1990 while part of the industrialized countries show emission 
levels slightly below 1990 levels. Given these assumptions, average abatement costs are plotted 
against income per capita for year 2030 in Figure 2.
3
Figure 2: Per capita income plotted against average abatement cost for selected countries
4
Data source: POLES model  
 
Note: Linear regression R
2 = 0.002 
 
Figure 2 confirms that the abatement costs are not linearly correlated to the level of income. 
Examining the four quadrants, some lessons for mitigative capacity can be drawn.   
                                                      
2 POLES is a world simulation model for the energy sector (European Commission, 1996). It works in a year-by-year 
recursive simulation and partial equilibrium framework, with endogenous international energy prices and lagged 
adjustments of supply and demand by world region. GDP and population are the main exogenous variables. The 
world is divided into 38 countries or regions. For each country or region, the model articulates the following 
modules: final energy demand by key sectors, new and renewable energy technologies, conventional energy and 
electricity transformation system, fossil fuel supply. The main outputs comprise detailed world energy outlooks, 
marginal greenhouse gas emission abatement costs, and technology improvement scenarios.  
 
3 Costs are expressed in 1995 $ while GDP per capita are in 1995 $ PPP. 
4 Each plot on the figure is associated with a POLES’ region or country. But the names are not all posted so as to get 
a clear view.  
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The bottom-right quadrant contains countries with relatively high ability to pay and low average 
abatement costs.  These countries clearly have high mitigative capacity (income) and are also 
able to translate this into actual mitigation due to low costs. The USA, Finland, Canada, South 
Korea, and Australia-New Zealand are examples among the set of countries shown here.  
In the opposite quadrant (top-left), mitigative capacity is conversely low.  In this example, 
South American countries excluding Brazil, Central American countries excluding Mexico, 
Egypt show low abilities to pay. Their relatively high average abatement costs means that this 
capacity can be turned into even less actual mitigation.  
The more complex cases arise in the remaining two quadrants. There is a group of poorer 
countries with low abatement cost curves in the bottom-left quadrant. Considering only average 
abatement cost, levels of actual mitigation might have been high; but in reality are not, since 
countries simply cannot afford to take advantage of low costs. China, India as well as Russia 
fall into this quadrant.  
In the top-right quadrant, there is a group of high-income countries, which have relatively high 
mitigation costs. Mitigative capacity, as approximated by income, is equally high as in the 
bottom-right quadrant. However, higher costs mean that the ability to reduce emissions is not 
realised to the same extent.  In some cases (e.g. Japan), this may be due to higher levels of 
efficiency in the economy already, so that additional improvements are more costly.  Compared 
to the bottom-left quadrant, however, this group of countries still has higher mitigative capacity, 
simply by virtue of their higher ability to pay.   
The conclusions drawn about countries or regions are illustrative. They are, of course, strongly 
determined by the model itself
5 and by the mitigation scenario that we have assumed. Still, it is 
interesting to note that the conclusions are similar when assuming an emissions reduction rate of 
40 % or 60 % relative to 2030 reference levels for all countries. Comparing the -20% case (see 
Figure 2) with a -60% case (not shown here), we found both Finland and the US to have high 
mitigative capacity, with high ability to pay. They also both have low abatement costs, 
indicating that they should be able to translate this capacity into actual mitigation. On their own, 
the economic factors clearly do not explain why the former acts under the Kyoto Protocol while 
the latter does not.  
3.3  Opportunity cost  
The issue of opportunity costs was raised in examining the situation of poorer countries with 
low average abatement costs (see the bottom-left quadrant in Figure 2). Opportunity cost is 
defined in economics as the best foregone alternative use of the money. Alternative demands on 
the budget are a crucial issue for developing countries, who have long argued that they need to 
develop and during this process cannot take on mitigation commitments. Opportunity costs are 
not simply economic considerations, but part of political economy. Low-income countries do 
not spend on mitigation even if they have low-cost mitigation opportunities, simply because 
they are spending their income on other things, for example development.  
The trade-off between expenditure on mitigation and other goods can be represented graphically 
by a production possibility frontier (PPF), as in Figure 3. The assumption is that a country’s 
economy produces mitigation and ‘all other goods’. Scarce resources are not equally useful in 
all activities. The resources are traded directly, and prices do not enter the analysis.  
The concave shape of the frontier implies an increasing opportunity cost of mitigation – for a 
small amount of mitigation and high amount of ‘other goods’, relatively little else is foregone 
per unit of mitigation, but as more mitigation is undertaken, relatively more ’other goods’ are 
foregone (following Norgaard 1994; De Canio et al. 2000).  
                                                      
5 Like marginal abatement costs, average abatement costs may differ widely from one model to the other for a given 
abatement scenario. Comparisons of marginal abatement costs across models and analysis of the discrepancies 
have been performed for example in (Weyant et al. , 1999; Blanchard et al., 2000) 
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In many cases, ‘other goods’ might represent development, in as far as economic growth and 
emissions remain coupled.  In some cases, however, development may be achieved in a more 
sustainable manner, e.g. providing access to electricity through renewables. The shape of the 
PPF (e.g. the solid line in Figure 3) is a key factor in mitigative capacity.  




In Figure 3, the current situation of a given economy or sector may be at point A, i.e. not at the 
production possibility frontier. In this situation, the country or sector is not using its resources to 
their full extent.  If this is the case, the economy can move from A to three different points on 
the PPF.   
●  Moving from A to B’ increases mitigation, but does not add to other goods.  
●  Shifting to B’’’ by contrast only increases other goods, but does not reduce emissions.   
●  The move from A to B’’ is a vector that has both components, i.e. more ‘other goods’ are 
produced while also reducing emissions.  
The three paths indicate different responses to the same opportunity costs, represented by the 
shape of the PPF curve.  
If a country is already on the PPF, then its options are limited to shifts along the PPF.  Unless, 
that is, it can expand the PPF to a new level, i.e. increase its overall capacity to mitigate and 
provide more ‘other goods’ to its people, as in the dotted lines in Figure 3. The PPF need not 
expand evenly in all directions, but could change unevenly as shown with the second dotted line 
below.  
The reasons why the PPF might expand could include a rise in national income over time, a 
technological break-through that makes more mitigation available at lower cost, and related a 
lower cost per unit of mitigation (not shown explicitly in the PPF context).  In other words, the 
expansion of the PPF represents an increase in capacity, rather than explains it.  The cost factors 
considered above, together with the institutional factors and availability of resources, influence 
the shape of the PPF.  If a country is able to shift its PPF to allow more mitigation while still 
developing other goods, its mitigative capacity is increased.  
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The discussion of economic factors suggests that at least three factors combine to shape 
mitigative capacity. Ability to pay, as approximated by income, is an important capacity. 
However, how effectively that capacity can be converted into actual mitigation depends on the 
costs of abatement. Foregone expenditure on other goods, the opportunity cost, will further 
influence whether mitigative capacity is exercised – a country may have high mitigative 
capacity, but not use this capacity due to other demands on its budget.  Figure 2 provided an 
example - for a hypothetical level of mitigation effort – of how the interrelationship between 
ability to pay and abatement cost varies across countries.   
Economic factors, such as income and costs, do not exist in isolation, but in the context of 
institutions.  Next, we turn to a set of institutional factors that influence mitigative capacity.  
 
4.  Institutional factors   
A variety of institutional factors shape mitigative capacity.  Key factors include the 
effectiveness of regulation in government and for markets, the skills base of a country, and 
levels of public awareness. Most of these factors are qualitative, although some quantitative data 
can help illustrate variation of capacity across countries.   
4.1  Regulatory effectiveness and market rules 
The ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies shapes their ability to 
reduce GHG emissions.  The capacity to monitor and enforce regulations will shape regulatory 
control over private entities. The effectiveness of the court system in enforcing contracts is a 
particular instance. If strong monitoring capacity exists in general, it is more likely that a 
government will be able to regulate private entities in achieving GHG emission reductions.   
In developing countries, some initial experience with institutional capacity for mitigation has 
been gathered through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Some developing countries 
have set up Designated National Authorities very rapidly, while others are not doing so at all.  
For poorer countries, it may make more sense to use existing institutional mechanisms, e.g. 
environmental impact assessments, to also deal with CDM projects (Winkler et al. 2005). The 
interaction appears to work in both directions – an expectation of potential mitigation projects 
motivates countries to set up institutions, but the presence of CDM offices in turn markets the 
country as a destination for climate investment. The initial lessons from the CDM provide some 
indication of potential government effectiveness in taking on quantified mitigation 
commitments. Higher regulatory effectiveness in government means higher mitigative capacity.  
Effective rules for markets are another important factor. Clear market rules are needed to 
effectively apply economic mechanisms for mitigation.  To impose a carbon tax, for example, 
assumes capacity of government not only to adopt the tax policy, but to effectively collect taxes 
from private entities. If there is no underlying competitive market for everyday goods and 
services, policy approaches such as taxes and trading may not live up to their theoretical 
potential. Participation in trading emissions requires legal institutions to ensure secure 
transactions and legal remedies.  Existing markets for other goods would ensure that capital 
markets are in place and credit is available. Stronger markets imply a higher mitigative capacity.  
4.2  Education and skills base  
 
The skills base of a country is an important factor of mitigative capacity. Yohe’s fifth 
determinant of mitigative capacity is the stock of human capital. In fact, basic education is 
essential for mitigation purposes, be it at the level of individuals, civil society, local 
communities, local authorities, national authorities or economic sectors. Education may raise 
public awareness of climate change, which may induce individual behavioural changes. It may 
also contribute to the building of expertise in climate change issues at the country level. 
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Assessments such as GHG inventories or mitigation policies and strategies may be performed 
by national experts. These experts in turn advise policy makers. Basic education also plays a 
role in the deployment of mitigation technologies: it stands as a precondition for learning how to 
use available technologies, adapt them to the country’s context and further develop a country’s 
own set of mitigation technologies.  
Table 1 shows the education index of selected countries as calculated in the Climate Analysis 
and Indicators Tool (CAIT) (WRI 2005), and the elementary components of the index.  
Table 1: Education index, adult literacy rate, school enrolment ratio, 2001 
Data source : CAIT (WRI 2005) 
  Index Adult  Literacy  rate   Enrolment Ratio 
Country  (2/3 literacy rate, 1/3 
enrolment ratio) 
(% of people aged 15 
and above) 
(% of population of school 
age enrolled in education) 
United Kingdom  100  99  100 
United States of America  97.6  99  94 
Germany 95.6  99  89 
South Korea  95.5  97.9  91 
Japan 93.2  99  83 
Russian Federation  92.8  99  82 
Brazil 88.5  87.3  95 
Mexico 83.5  91.4  74 
South Africa  80.4  85.6  78 
China 74.9  85.8  64 
India 49.2  58  56 
 
 
A higher basic education level is a factor for higher mitigative capacity. This is the case for the 
industrialized countries and South Korea as shown in Table 1. Conversely developing countries 
such as Brazil, Mexico, China and India show relatively lower education indexes, which may 
contribute to lower mitigative capacity.  
Still countries need more than basic education to absorb mitigation technologies and create new-
to-the world mitigation innovations
6. Researchers are critical to mitigative capacity in this 
respect. The higher the number of researchers per million people is, the higher the mitigative 
capacity tends to be.  
                                                      
6 Technological absorption is not only about learning but also adapting, upgrading existing technologies towards the 
creation of new technologies (Narula, 2004)  
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Table 2: Number of researchers per million inhabitants for selected countries 
Data source : UNESCO (2005) 
 
Country Year  Researchers per million 
inhabitants 
Japan 2000  5,104 
United States of America  1999  4,526 
Russian Federation  2000  3,479 
Germany 2000  3,137 
United Kingdom  1998  2,691 
South Korea   2000  2,305 
China 2000  550 
Brazil 2000  352 
Mexico 1999  227 
South Africa  2002  192 
India 1998  120 
 
 
Table 2 shows a wide gap between industrialized countries and developing countries, while 
South Korea tends to catch up with industrialized countries. The latter clearly benefit from at 
least four times more staff to carry out research than developing countries. Their capacity to 
innovate towards climate-friendly technologies is therefore enhanced. 
4.3  Public attitudes and awareness  
Public attitudes and awareness are hard to pin down, but clearly important in shaping mitigative 
capacity. Very generally, a culture of compliance enhances regulatory effectiveness, while a 
society with a more internatioanl orientation is more likely to take mitigative action than an 
isolated one. Attitudes to climate change can range from treating it as a serious problem 
requiring action, to perceiving it as a threat to be avoided or denied. Institutions which are 
important are a free press, and civil society organisations.   
Escalating public concern and awareness about the climate change issue is closely linked to the 
influence, effectiveness, and agenda of national media.  For instance, it was not until the 
Warning of a Threatening Climate Catastrophe, published by the Energy Working Group of the 
German Physical Society in 1985, that the climate change issue was transformed from a purely 
research agenda into a national political agenda (Cavender-Bares et al. 2001).  Press coverage of 
this report presented the public with scenes of environmental disasters resulting from climate 
change, fundamentally changing the framing of the issue. As a result, extensive reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions were recommended, and the West German cabinet agreed to a 25-
30% carbon dioxide reduction by 2005 (Cavender-Bares et al. 2001).  Although attention to the 
issue was declining by 1992, municipalities began to set their own reduction targets, and 
implement concrete measures by which to reach them (Cavender-Bares et al. 2001). 
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Similar trends are present in Mexico, where climate change became an issue of considerable 
public and government concern in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Public awareness of the issue 
grew following a severe drought in 1989, which coincided with scientific claims about global 
warming from the United States (Liverman & O'Brien 2001).  As a result, president Carlos 
Salinas (1988-1994) committed to planting 32 million trees, and in 1992, the Federal Electricity 
Commission put forward $10 million to install low-energy, high-efficiency light bulbs in the 
cities of Monterey and Guadalajara (Liverman & O'Brien 2001).  
 Public awareness and attitudes about climate change may also be influenced by factors other 
than traditional forms of news media. In the United States, for instance, the Hollywood movie 
The Day After Tomorrow, which depicted catastrophic events following the shut-down of the 
North Atlantic thermo-haline circulation system, substantially influenced the attitudes of a 
majority of the 10% of Americans who viewed the movie (Liverman & O'Brien 2001).  These 
movie-goers were considerably more likely than those who did not attend the movie to carry out 
mitigative action in response to climate change, and to favourably consider information 
provided by scientists and environmental groups regarding the climate change risk (Liverman & 
O'Brien 2001).  Although the effect of the movie on the public at a national scale was 
insignificant, the influence of popular forms of mass entertainment on public attitudes, and thus 
on regulatory effectiveness and mitigative capacity, should not be underestimated. 
Broader public awareness is a factor that may be hard to quantify precisely, but is nonetheless 
powerful in translating mitigative capacity into mitigation.  The educational base and regulatory 
effectiveness described above are important in shaping mitigative capacity. Technological 
factors, considered in the following section, operate in this institutional context.  
5.  Technological factors  
Technology also contributes to mitigative capacity in various respects (Blanchard 2005). 
Current technologies used in countries emit more or less GHG per unit of output, therefore 
providing more or less ability to reduce emissions. A country’s capacity to absorb climate-
friendly technologies already in use in other countries or develop new-to-the world technologies 
also plays a role in shaping mitigative capacity.  
In this respect, the number of researchers per million inhabitants has already been suggested as a 
quantitative indicator (section 4.2). Nevertheless, access to infrastructures such as power 
utilities and information and communication (IC) devices is also essential in the technological 
development of a country (UN Millennium Project 2004). International data on the access to 
electricity does not exist. Electricity consumption may be used as a proxy for developing 
countries (not for industrialized countries where the access rate is close to 100 %). The number 
of (mainline and cellular) telephones per 1000 people and the number of Internet users per 1000 
people are indicators of the access to IC technologies.  
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Table 3: Electricity consumption, number of telephones, Internet users of selected countries  
Data source : Millennium Project (2004) 
Country  Electricity consumption 
(kWh/cap), 2000 
Telephones per 1000 
people, 2001 
Internet users per 
1000 people, 2001 
United States of America 12331  1118 501 
Japan 7628  1174  384 
Germany 5963  1317  374 
South Korea  5607  1106  521 
United Kingdom  5601  1358  330 
Russian Federation  4181  296  29 
South Africa  3745  353  65 
Brazil 1878  385  47 
Mexico 1655  354  36 
China 827  248  26 
India 355  44  7 
Table 3  shows a gap between industrialized countries and developing countries: access to 
infrastructures is much higher in the former, suggesting a higher mitigative capacity. South 
Korea stands at the level of industrialized countries for all indicators, while Russia shows low 
access rates to IC technologies suggesting a lower mitigative capacity than other industrialized 
countries. 
The capacity of a country to absorb climate-friendly technology or develop new-to-the world 
technologies influences its mitigative capacity.  How much technological capacity gets turned 
into mitigation is part of the consideration in the following section. More broadly, we address 
the translation of the ability to reduce GHG emissions into action to mitigate.  
 
6.  From mitigative capacity to mitigation 
How does mitigative capacity get translated into actual mitigation?  The process appears to have 
several steps.  We noted that at a general level, all response capacity is rooted in the same 
substrate – the development path of a country.  This general capacity can be turned into specific 
forms of mitigative capacity, for example an energy efficiency agency. Depending on the 
flexibility of institutions, capacity might be reversible, i.e. even if it was designed initially for 
mitigative capacity, it might be transferable to adaptive capacity. There is a small set of actions 
which achieve both mitigaton and adaptation, but others that are specific to one response.   
Mitigative capacity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for mitigative action. Capacity is 
based on the objective factors such as economic factors, institutions and technology.  This 
concept, however, does not speak to whether or not nations will translate capacity into action.  
A variety of barriers exist to the effective translation of capacity into mitigative action. 
Abatement costs and political willingness, for instance, may play some role in determining 
whether or not capacity is turned into action in response to the climate change risk.  These 
examples of barriers to mitigation are examined in more detail below.   
The discussion of abatement cost (section 3.2) showed that it is a barrier that might prevent 
high mitigative capacity (in higher-income countries) from being translated into actual 
mitigation. Taking a national perspective, it is the GDP (or income) that gives capacity to 
mitigate. Higher abatement cost means that that financial capacity will be translated into less 
mitigation.  But a country’s ability to reduce emissions is not limited by the cost, but rather is 
only limited by the fact that countries have budget constraints.   
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Comparing two countries with the same limited budget, one (e.g Japan) with a higher abatement 
cost is not able to mitigate as much as one with a lower abatement cost (e.g the US).  It cannot 
turn its limited mitigative capacity into as much mitigation.  In relative terms, Japan’s ability to 
reduce GHG emissions is lower than that of the US. High abatement cost is a barrier to turning 
mitigative capacity  into actual mitigation.   
Another potential barrier to mitigation is political willingness. Political willingness is not itself a 
determinant of mitigative capacity.  Rather, political willingness is itself shaped by factors that 
also determine mitigative capacity.  For example, if a country faces high levels of poverty, then 
the political willingness to address GHG emissions will probably be low. Thus, the preceding 
analysis on mitigative capacity can help explain why political willingness is low in some 
instances. Different political cultures and styles – anticipatory or reactive; consensus-based or 
impositional (Richardson & Watts 1985) – influence the capacity to act at national and local 
levels. Political willingness becomes a barrier in translating mitigative capacity into actual 
mitigation. 
However, there are also other factors that shape political willingness that are independent from 
considerations of mitigative capacity and other national circumstances.  Those factors include 
the personal perceptions, preferences, and judgments of decision-makers that are presently in 
power, the results of elections, etc. For example, a very narrow victory by one candidate can 
have a very large influence on political willingness, and therefore actual mitigation action. 
Various factors may suggest mitigative capacity and mitigation opportunities exist, but they 
remain unexploited. A good example is the United States 
The response of the United States to global environmental risks, for instance, is often 
characterized by a multiplicity of positions, all lacking ultimate authority.  This results from the 
design of American political institutions, which are intended to prevent any single institution or 
official from exercising complete authority (Porter & Vernon 1991).  The political style of 
environmental policy in the US tends to be more confrontational, compared to consensual 
approaches in several European countries (Lindquist 1980).  As such, exceptional latitude is 
allowed for independent initiatives that are fragmented and overlapping.  With respect to the 
issues of climate change mitigation, the recent position of the Bush administration to avoid 
commitment to global climate mitigation policy arises not out of a lack of mitigative capacity, 
but a lack of political will rooted in such issues as perceived threats to sovereignty and 
protection of certain special interests.  Paradoxically, however, it was Bush’s rejection of the 
Kyoto Protocol that, in part, stimulated greater willingness to mitigate climate change for other 
countries (Grubb 2004).  
A factor influencing mitigative capacity at the national level is the ability to conclude 
international agreements and give them effect in domestic law. International agreements are 
hard to translate into federal law in the US.  Lack of federal action on climate change (beyond 
voluntary measures and business-as-usual intensity targets) has spurred substantial action at the 
state and local levels in the United States. However, local action is constrained - for example, 
states cannot mandate fuel economy standards. Allocation of decision-making authority 
intersects with political will. If the federal government does not act, local and state governments 
retain some mitigative capacity, but their ability to translate this into mitigation is limited.  
In contrast to the response of the United States government to the problem of global climate 
change is that of Germany. Despite scientific uncertainty, the climate change issue was pushed 
onto the German political agenda, leading to substantial mitigative action, with public 
awareness playing an important role (see above). Germans expect the federal government to 
take strong action in many spheres, including climate (Richardson & Watts 1985). This 
promotes a precautionary and proactive approach to decision-making and allowed a for 
translation of international agreements into a domestic target (25-30% cut in CO2 emissions by 
2005 (Cavender-Bares et al. 2001)). Political willingness in a particular institutional context 
allowed mitigative capacity to be turned into goals for actual mitigation.  
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Abatement cost and political willingness are two important barriers, but clearly not the only 
ones. Additional factors that may influence the amount of mitigation undertaken are: the 
relationship between the expert and lay communities, risk perception, industry-regulator 
relationships, the power and influence of interest groups, and a nation’s historical culture and 
self-perception (Burch & Robinson 2005). Further research must be carried out to further 
investigate the nature of the mitigative capacity/mitigation link, and its connection with 
components of the underlying development path. For example, perceptions of dread and 
unfamiliarity may translate into varying, but still rational, characterizations of risk. Socio-
political variables, such as economic insecurity and environmental justice have also been shown 
to be related to risk perception (Satterfield et al. 2004).  With respect to climate change, 
differing perceptions of risk may lead to wide variation in adaptation and mitigation.  In 
particular, high levels of perceived risk may lead to the activation of adaptive or mitigative 
capacity, and the subsequent implementation of effective response policies. Psychological and 
socio-cultural models of risk perception help to elucidate the human dimensions of climate 
change adaptation and mitigation, and may assist in the creation of more effective policies in 
response to climate change. 
Mitigative capacity in and of itself is not useful; it needs to be turned into mitigative action.  In 
addition to making a conceptual distinction between mitigative capacity and actual mitigation, 
we have examined some of the barriers – notably abatement cost and political willingness – 
which might prevent capacity from being realised.   In conclusion, we reflect on the overall 
findings on factors influencing mitigative capacity.  
7. Conclusion   
 
This article has sought to build on Yohe’s seminal piece on mitigative capacity which elaborates 
‘determinants’ of mitigative capacity, also reflected in the IPCC’s third assessment. We propose 
a revised definition, where mitigative capacity is a country’s ability to reduce anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions or enhance natural sinks. This capacity can relate either to reducing 
emissions through climate policy, or making development more sustainable and avoiding 
emissions. The conceptual framework links mitigative capacity  to sustainable development. All 
response capacities are seen to be rooted in a country’s development path, and making 
development more sustainable helps avoid emissions.  
Our conceptual framework groups the factors influencing mitigative capacity into three main 
sets:  economic factors, institutional ones, and technology.  Three economic factors – income, 
abatement cost and opportunity cost – interact to determine mitigative capacity. A greater ability 
to pay (income) means a higher mitigative capacity. Abatement cost is found to be an important 
factor in translating capacity into actual mitigation. We show how these parameters vary across 
countries. Institutional factors that promote mitigative capacity include the effectiveness of 
government regulation, clear market rules, a skilled work force and public awareness. The 
flexibility of institutions, we argued, will influence the extent to which they can apply a capacity 
intended for one use (mitigation) to another (adaptation). Some capacities, notably financial, 
may be more divisible than others.  It is in the translation of mitigative capacity into mitigation 
that capacities become more specific. Technology is a critical mitigative capacity, including the 
ability to absorb existing climate-friendly technologies or to develop innovative ones.  
Mitigative capacity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for mitigative action. Capacity is 
based on the objective factors such as resource availability, social capital, and the presence of 
technological options. Mitigative capacity explains how much countries could mitigate, not (by 
itself) how much they in fact mitigate.  We considered barriers, such as high abatement cost or 
lack of political willingness, that prevent mitigative capacity from being translated into 
mitigation.  An important further analytical step will be to examine how mitigative capacity can 
be turned into actual mitigation.  
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